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“Detention” under the Charter after 
R. v. Grant and R. v. Suberu 
Steven Penney* and James Stribopoulos** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In R. v. Grant1 and R. v. Suberu,2 the Supreme Court of Canada revis-
ited the relationship between police detention powers and the Charter.3 In 
Grant it updated the test for deciding whether a “detention” has arisen 
for Charter purposes. This question is critical for two reasons: first, “de-
tention” is the trigger for the constitutional guarantee forbidding arbitrary 
detention (section 94); and second, it is one of the two triggers (the other 
being “arrest”) of the right to be informed of the reasons for detention 
(section 10(a)) and the right to counsel (section 10(b)).5 In Suberu the 
Court held (in contrast to some lower courts) that absent exigent safety 
concerns, the section 10(b) caution must be given immediately to persons 
subject to the common law power of investigative detention.  
Grant and Suberu have their doctrinal virtues. Grant’s multi-factor 
approach for assessing whether or not there has been a psychological 
detention is flexible and nuanced. It fails, however, to give police suffi-
cient guidance on the scope of their authority. In our view, this 
uncertainty is likely to have three unfortunate effects. First, it will cause 
too many errors, that is, cases where police incorrectly decide (in relation 
to what the courts will or would have found) that a detention has or has 
not arisen. Second, in the face of this uncertainty, police will more often 
than not assume that a detention has not occurred and (and when they are 
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1
 [2009] S.C.J. No. 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grant”].  
2
 [2009] S.C.J. No. 33, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Suberu”]. 
3
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
4
 Section 9 of the Charter states: “Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or 
imprisoned.”  
5
 Section 10(a) and (b) of the Charter states: “Everyone has the right on arrest or detention 
(a) to be informed promptly of the reasons therefor; [and] (b) to retain and instruct counsel without 
delay and to be informed of that right ...”. 
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wrong) thereby deprive those detained of their rights under sections 9 
and 10 of the Charter. Finally, in applying Grant, lower courts will too 
often take an overly deferential approach toward police decision-making.  
Suberu’s virtue, in contrast, is its simplicity: police now know that 
they must issue the section 10(b) caution immediately upon any type of 
detention, including investigative detention. Of course, if it is often un-
certain whether a detention has arisen, the benefit of this simplicity will 
be muted. More troubling, the Court’s failure to carve out an exception to 
the section 10(b) caution requirement for investigative detention will 
likely have three perverse effects: increasing the length and intrusiveness 
of detentions, diminishing law enforcement safety and effectiveness, and 
causing courts to avoid finding that a detention has arisen despite sub-
stantial intrusions on individual liberty.  
In what follows we first review the jurisprudential history leading to 
Grant’s holding on detention. Next we consider this holding and its ap-
plication to the facts in Grant and Suberu. We then outline our thesis 
regarding Grant’s flaws and suggest how the approach to deciding 
whether there has been a psychological “detention” should be further 
reformed. Last, we trace the history of the relationship between the 
common law power to detain for investigative purposes and section 10 of 
the Charter, and flesh out the case for justifying an override of section 
10(b) during such detentions. 
II. THE MEANING OF DETENTION UNDER THE CHARTER 
1. History and Context 
Absent detention, police enjoy considerable freedom in questioning 
suspects.6 Questioning may produce evidence of wrongdoing, because 
the answers are either incriminating or reveal the location of physical 
evidence. If the detention threshold is crossed, however, the constitu-
tional implications are significant. First, if police lack the requisite legal 
grounds to detain,7 section 9 of the Charter is violated.8 Second, as  
                                                                                                             
6
 Other than the Charter, the only significant restraint on police questioning of adult sus-
pects stems from the common law voluntary confessions rule. See generally R. v. Oickle, [2000] 
S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).  
7
 In order to lawfully detain, a police officer must have reasonable grounds to suspect a 
clear nexus between the individual to be detained and a recently committing or still unfolding crimi-
nal offence. See R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at paras. 34, 45 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Mann”]. 
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mentioned, detention also triggers informational duties under section 10 
of the Charter. This information may alert suspects to the potential jeop-
ardy faced and cause them to stop talking. As a result, until they are 
ready to effect an arrest, the police will often want to avoid a detention.9 
It is the courts, however, not the police, who ultimately decide whether 
and when the detention threshold was crossed in a given case.  
It was a case involving section 10(b), the right to counsel, which first 
raised the meaning of detention before the Supreme Court. In R. v. Ther-
ens,
10
 police subjected a motorist to a breath demand under the Criminal 
Code.11 He was taken back to the police station, took and failed a 
breathalyzer test, and was arrested. At the time of the demand, police did 
not apprise him of his right to counsel, which section 10(b) requires on 
“detention”.  
The issue before the Court in Therens was whether the motorist was 
“detained” following the breath demand but before his arrest. The Court 
                                                                                                             
8
 The Court in Grant sensibly recognized that any unlawful interference with an individual’s 
liberty is necessarily arbitrary and violates s. 9 of the Charter. Earlier lower court decisions holding 
otherwise, the Court confirmed, should no longer be followed. See Grant, supra, note 1, at paras. 54-55. 
The Court specifically cited R. v. Duguay, [1985] O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), which 
held that not every unlawful detention is necessarily arbitrary and suggested a need to consider the 
detaining officer’s mindset. For example, an oblique motive would result in finding an arbitrary deten-
tion but an honest mistake based on grounds just short of those required by the law might not. Id., at 
296. Prior to Grant, the Duguay approach had been widely followed. See R. v. Brown, [1987] N.S.J. 
No. 22, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 54, at 67-68 (N.S.C.A.); Freeman v. West Vancouver (District), [1992] B.C.J. 
No. 2146, 19 B.C.A.C. 81, at para. 29 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Campbell, [2003] M.J. No. 207, 175 C.C.C. 
(3d) 452, at paras. 39-42 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Perello, [2005] S.J. No. 60, 193 C.C.C. (3d) 151, at para. 40 
(Sask. C.A.); R. v. Pimental, [2000] M.J. No. 256, 145 Man. R. (2d) 295 (Man. C.A.), leave to appeal 
refused [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 359 (S.C.C.). But see R. v. Iron, [1987] S.J. No. 49, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 157 
(Sask. C.A.) (detention necessarily arbitrary if not authorized by either statute or common law); R. v. 
Simpson, [1994] N.J. No. 69, 88 C.C.C. (3d) 377, at 388 (Nfld. C.A.), revd in the result only [1995] 
S.C.J. No. 12, 95 C.C.C. (3d) 96 (S.C.C.) (implicitly questioning Duguay approach but without refer-
ring to it). The Duguay approach had also been criticized by commentators. See Don Stuart, Charter 
Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 3d ed. (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 2001), at 263 [hereinafter 
“Stuart”]; James Stribopoulos, “The Forgotten Right: Section 9 of the Charter, Its Purpose and Mean-
ing” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 211, at 218-31 [hereinafter “Stribopoulos, ‘The Forgotten Right’”]. 
9
 See Casey Hill, “Investigative Detention: A Search / Seizure by Any Other Name?” 
(2008) 40 S.C.LR. (2d) 179 [hereinafter “Hill”], who notes that there is  
a situational incentive for the police to provide the suspect less, rather than more, infor-
mation about the transaction under investigation as the investigator’s questions attempt to 
draw out information about the suspect’s recent whereabouts, association with others, 
route, etc., committing the detainee to an account for evaluation against the officer’s pos-
sessed and incoming information.  
Id., at 204. 
10
 [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Therens”].  
11
 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 235(1). Today, see Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as amended, 
s. 254(3). 
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had previously held12 that breath demands do not trigger a detention un-
der section 2(c)(ii) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, which provides the 
“right to retain and instruct counsel without delay” to persons “arrested 
or detained”.13 The fact that it is an offence to refuse to comply did not 
mean that a person subject to such a demand was legally detained.14 De-
tention, under the Canadian Bill of Rights, was limited to situations of 
“actual physical restraint”.15 
In Therens, Le Dain J. concluded that the meaning of detention under 
the Canadian Bill of Rights was not controlling under the Charter. 
Rather, he reasoned that detention under the Charter should be read more 
broadly.16 In addition to physical constraint, he asserted, a detention also 
arises when police assume “control over the movement of a person by a 
demand or direction which may have significant legal consequence and 
which prevents or impedes access to counsel”.17 Given the legal duty on 
the motorist to accompany the police officer for the purposes of adminis-
tering a breath test, this would have been enough to dispose of the 
appeal. But Le Dain J. went a step further, holding that a detention may 
sometimes arise even when there is neither physical restraint nor “crimi-
nal liability for failure to comply” with a legal duty.18 He explained: 
                                                                                                             
12
 R. v. Chromiak, [1979] S.C.J. No. 116, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 471 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Chromiak”]. 
13
 Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, s. 2(c)(ii) (emphasis added). 
14
 Chromiak, supra, note 12, at 478. 
15
 Id. 
16
 In so concluding, he emphasized “that the Charter must be regarded, because of its con-
stitutional character, as a new affirmation of rights and freedoms and of judicial power and 
responsibility in relation to their protection”. Therens, supra, note 10, at 638, Le Dain J. dissenting 
(on other grounds). He also went on to explain two further reasons for rejecting the narrow definition 
from Chromiak. First, he acknowledged that the judiciary had felt rather restrained in its use of the 
Canadian Bill of Rights given that it was simply legislation and therefore lacked constitutional 
status. Id. In addition, given that the Canadian Bill of Rights did not include any equivalent to s. 1 of 
the Charter, a narrow interpretation of “detention” was the only means by which the Court in 
Chromiak could place reasonable limits on the right to counsel. Id., at 639. Of course, s. 1 of the 
Charter now permits the Supreme Court to balance individual and state interests more transparently.  
17
 Therens, id., at 642, Le Dain J., dissenting (on other grounds). All eight judges in Therens 
agreed that the accused was detained, however only three others expressly adopted Le Dain J.’s 
reasoning. A unanimous Court subsequently endorsed Le Dain J.’s approach. See R. v. Thomsen, 
[1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 649 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Thomsen”]. Therens’ ap-
proach to defining detention has since been repeatedly affirmed by the Court. See R. v. Simmons, 
[1988] S.C.J. No. 86, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495 (S.C.C.); R. v. Feeney, [1997] S.C.J. No. 49, [1997] 2 
S.C.R. 13, at 55 (S.C.C.); R. v. Prosper, [1994] S.C.J. No. 72, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236, at 272-73 
(S.C.C.); Dehghani v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] S.C.J. No. 38, 
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 1053, at 1065-66 (S.C.C.). 
18
 Therens, id., at 644. 
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In my opinion, it is not realistic, as a general rule, to regard compliance 
with a demand or direction by a police officer as truly voluntary, in the 
sense that the citizen feels that he or she has the choice to obey or not. 
… Most citizens are not aware of the precise legal limits of police 
authority. Rather than risk the application of physical force or 
prosecution for wilful obstruction, the reasonable person is likely to err 
on the side of caution, assume lawful authority and comply with the 
demand. The element of psychological compulsion, in the form of a 
reasonable perception of suspension of freedom of choice, is enough to 
make the restraint of liberty involuntary. Detention may be effected 
without the application or threat of application of physical restraint if 
the person concerned submits or acquiesces in the deprivation of liberty 
and reasonably believes that the choice to do otherwise does not exist.19 
Not long after Therens was decided, its definition of “detention” for 
section 10 Charter purposes was transplanted to section 9. The Supreme 
Court concluded that there is “no reason in principle why the general 
approach to the meaning of detention reflected in those cases should not 
be applied to the meaning of ‘detained’ in s. 9”.20  
Therens thus had the effect of recognizing three categories of deten-
tion, now pertinent for both sections 9 and 10 of the Charter: (i) 
psychological restraint (with legal compulsion); (ii) psychological re-
straint (without legal compulsion); and (iii) physical restraint.21 
The second of these categories — the one addressed in Grant — has 
proved to be the trickiest. On its face, the test is paradoxical: it deems peo-
ple to be “detained” for Charter purposes even though their liberty is not 
limited by law. Despite their (reasonable) belief that they must comply 
with police requests, they actually have no legal obligation to do so. (We 
thus sometimes refer to this category as “non-legal” psychological deten-
tion.) As the Court explained in Grant, “an individual confronted by state 
authority ordinarily has the option to choose simply to walk away”.22 
How has this situation arisen? We can imagine a legal regime requir-
ing police to tell people whether they are legally obliged to cooperate. 
Before stopping and questioning, for example, police would have to tell 
                                                                                                             
19
 Id. This is in keeping with the Supreme Court’s eventual recognition in Grant that the 
purpose of s. 9 is both to protect “physical liberty” as well as “mental liberty”. See Grant, supra, 
note 1, at para. 20.  
20
 R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621, at 632 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. 
Ladouceur, [1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257, at 1277 (S.C.C.). 
21
 See Therens, supra, note 10, at 641-44, Le Dain J., dissenting; Thomsen, supra, note 17, 
at 648-49. In Grant the Court specifically reaffirmed these three categories of detention first recog-
nized in Therens. See Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 30. 
22
 Grant, id., at para. 21. 
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suspects that they are either: (i) being detained under law for a particular 
purpose (with an explanation as to what they are legally required to do 
and what they are free to refuse to do); or (ii) not being detained and free 
to leave or remain silent.23  
Neither Parliament nor the courts, however, have seen fit to impose 
such a regime.24 Instead, they have sanctioned a state of affairs in which 
police are permitted (as a general rule) to approach people and ask them 
questions without any particularized suspicion and without any need to 
inform them of their legal status or rights. As the Supreme Court ex-
plained in Grant: 
Section 9 of the Charter does not require that police abstain from 
interacting with members of the public until they have specific grounds 
to connect the individual to the commission of a crime. Nor does s. 10 
require that the police advise everyone at the outset of any encounter that 
they have no obligation to speak to them and are entitled to legal 
counsel.25  
Given this legal milieu, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court of 
Canada has recognized that people often assume that they must comply 
with police requests.26 Nor is it surprising, given the imbalance of power 
and potential for abuse inherent in such encounters, that the Court has 
found that a “detention” may occur for Charter purposes even in circum-
stances where an individual has no legal obligation to remain in the 
company of police and would be legally justified in simply walking away. 
When it comes to psychological detention, the challenge is demarcat-
ing the line between consensual and coerced encounters. This is no easy 
task. Encounters between individuals and the police are rich in their di-
versity. Most such experiences are relatively benign, usually involving 
nothing more than conversation.27 Such exchanges can become more in-
                                                                                                             
23
 See Law Reform Commission of Canada, Arrest (Report 29) (Ottawa: The Commission, 
1986), at 20; Stephen Coughlan, “Police Detention for Questioning: A Proposal” (1986) 28 Crim. 
L.Q. 170; Alan D. Gold, “Perspectives on Section 10(b): The Right to Counsel under the Charter” 
(1993) 22 C.R. (4th) 370, at 374 [hereinafter “Gold”].  
24
 The Grant Court did counsel police that if they are “uncertain whether their conduct is 
having a coercive effect on the individual, it is open to them to inform the subject in unambiguous 
terms that he or she is under no obligation to answer questions and is free to go”. Grant, supra, note 
1, at para. 32.  
25
 Grant, id., at para. 38. See also Suberu, supra, note 2, at para. 3.  
26
 Therens, supra, note 10. 
27
 See Mann, supra, note 7, at para. 19 (“the law has not yet reached a point that a compul-
sion to comply will be inferred whenever a police officer requests information, for that would mean 
police could never ask questions”). See also R. v. Grafe, [1987] O.J. No. 796, 60 C.R. (3d) 242 (Ont. 
C.A.); United States of America v. Alfaro, [1992] J.Q. no 831, 75 C.C.C. (3d) 211, at 236 (Que. 
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vasive, however, as consent and conversation shade over to coercion and 
interrogation. As noted, for non-legal psychological detention, the turn-
ing point is the moment when the suspect submits to police authority and 
reasonably believes that the choice to do otherwise does not exist.28  
Unfortunately, Therens failed to provide any concrete guidance to as-
sist lower courts in distinguishing consensual from coerced encounters. 
Without it, lower courts, almost invariably seeing only cases involving 
factually guilty claimants,29 have sometimes refrained from labelling 
ambiguously coercive encounters as detentions.30 
2. The Grant Standard for Psychological Detention without Legal 
Compulsion  
In Grant, the Supreme Court of Canada expressly reaffirmed Ther-
ens’ definition of detention, including the category of psychological 
restraint without legal compulsion.31 Under Grant, the ultimate question 
remains “whether the police conduct would cause a reasonable person to 
conclude that he or she was not free to go and had to comply with the 
police direction or demand”.32 But recognizing that this form of detention 
had “proven difficult to define consistently”,33 the Court added a consid-
erable measure of gloss. In so doing, however, it subtly narrowed the 
definition’s scope. Emphasizing a point absent from Therens, the Court 
stated that “not every trivial or insignificant interference with liberty at-
tracts Charter scrutiny”; rather, only the person “whose liberty is 
meaningfully constrained has genuine need of the additional rights ac-
corded by the Charter to people in that situation”.34 The coupling of 
                                                                                                             
C.A.); R. v. Elshaw, [1991] S.C.J. No. 68, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 24, at 53-70 (S.C.C.), L’Heureux-Dubé J., 
dissenting. 
28
 Therens, supra, note 10, at 644. 
29
 See Stribopoulos, “The Forgotten Right”, supra, note 8, at 237-39 (discussing selection 
bias ensuing from the fact that courts are presented only with encounters where evidence is obtained, 
placing pressure to uphold police actions to ensure conviction of the factually guilty).  
30
 Id., at 239-45 (discussing this trend, especially in the Ontario Court of Appeal). See e.g., 
R. v. Lawrence, [1990] O.J. No. 1648, 59 C.C.C. (3d) 55 (Ont. C.A.), where a police officer, investi-
gating a reported break-in, drove his police cruiser onto the sidewalk to block Ms. Lawrence from 
proceeding further on her bicycle. She was questioned for 25 minutes regarding where she lived. The 
officer disbelieved her and asked to look in her backpack; she complied, revealing evidence that 
implicated her in a break-in. She was then placed in the rear of the cruiser. The Court found that she 
was only detained after being placed in the police cruiser.  
31
 Grant, supra, note 1, at paras. 28-32. 
32
 Id., at para. 31. 
33
 Id.  
34
 Id., at para. 26 (emphasis added). The Court quoted here with approval from Mann, su-
pra, note 7, where Iacobucci J. noted (at para. 26) that 
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“detention” with “imprisonment” in section 9, the Court explained, sug-
gests that detention arises “when the deprivation of liberty may have 
legal consequences”.35  
The Court in Grant also stressed that the Therens test is objective, 
meaning that a police officer’s subjective intentions are not relevant in 
deciding if there was a detention.36 The suspect’s “particular circum-
stances and perceptions,” however, may be relevant “in assessing the 
reasonableness of any perceived power imbalance between the individual 
and the police, and thus the reasonableness of any perception that he or 
she had no choice but to comply with the police directive”.37 The claim-
ant’s testimony will usually be the best source of such evidence, the 
Court noted; but since the test is objective a claimant’s failure to testify is 
not fatal to finding a detention.38 
With this backdrop in place, the Court proceeded to identify a host of 
factors to consider when deciding whether a non-legal psychological de-
tention occurred. First, it emphasized the importance of determining the 
police’s purpose in approaching or questioning the claimant. If this pur-
pose was non-adversarial, a finding of detention is unlikely. For example, 
the Court stated that no detention would arise where police respond to an 
emergency call, even if they assume control over the situation or inter-
fere with a person’s freedom of movement.39 Similarly, there is no 
detention when police approach bystanders in the wake of an accident or 
crime to obtain preliminary information for their investigation.40 Depri-
vations of liberty that result from such encounters are not “significant 
enough to attract Charter scrutiny because they do not attract legal con-
sequences for the concerned individuals”.41  
According to the Court, neighbourhood policing initiatives (where 
police focus on meeting community needs and maintaining order) fall in 
                                                                                                             
... the police cannot be said to “detain”, within the meaning of ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter, 
every suspect they stop for purposes of identification, or even interview. The person who 
is stopped will in all cases be “detained” in the sense of “delayed”, or “kept waiting.” But 
the constitutional rights recognized by ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter are not engaged by de-
lays that involve no significant physical or psychological restraint. 
35
 Grant, id., at para. 29. 
36
 Id., at para. 32. The majority acknowledged that the officer’s subjective intentions will be 
relevant in deciding upon the appropriate remedy under s. 24(2) of the Charter if a violation is made 
out. Id. In contrast, Binnie J. emphasized the importance of considering the subjective mindset of the 
police in deciding whether or not a detention has taken place. See Grant, id., Binnie J., concurring.  
37
 Id., at para. 32.  
38
 Id., at para. 50.  
39
 Id., para. 36.  
40
 Id., at para. 37.  
41
 Id., at para. 36. 
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the non-adversarial category. It rightly acknowledged, however, that this 
sort of proactive policing can “subtly merge with the potentially coercive 
police role of investigating crime and arresting suspects so that they may 
be brought to justice”.42 
The Court contrasted these kinds of non-adversarial encounters with 
situations where police have a “[f]ocussed suspicion”.43 While focused 
suspicion does not in itself give rise to a detention, “police must be mind-
ful that, depending on how they act and what they say, the point may be 
reached where a reasonable person, in the position of that individual, 
would conclude he or she is not free to choose to walk away or decline to 
answer questions”.44  
The second factor the Court identified was the duration of the en-
counter.45 The shorter the interaction, the less likely it is to be labelled a 
detention. The longer the encounter, in contrast, the more likely a reason-
able person would feel unable to walk away.  
Third, the Court noted that physical contact between the police offi-
cer and the individual affected is a relevant consideration. But as with 
other variables, its significance hinges on context. The Court gave the 
example of a police officer “placing” his or her hand on someone’s arm: 
If sustained, it might well lead a reasonable person to conclude that his 
or her freedom to choose whether to cooperate or not has been 
removed. On the other hand, a fleeting touch may not, depending on the 
circumstances, give rise to a reasonable conclusion that one’s liberty 
has been curtailed.46  
Finally, the Court recognized that in some situations, “a single force-
ful act or word may be enough to cause a reasonable person to conclude 
that his or her right to choose how to respond has been removed”.47 No 
                                                                                                             
42
 Id., at para. 40. This observation by the Court reveals a perceptive appreciation of some 
of the realities of community policing. See Stephen M. Mastrofski, “Community Policing As Re-
form: A Cautionary Tale” [hereinafter “Mastrofski”] in Jack R. Green & Stephen D. Mastrofski, 
eds., Community Policing: Rhetoric Or Reality (New York: Praeger, 1988) 46, at 53 (noting that 
“aggressive order maintenance strategies” are often part and parcel of community policing efforts 
and can include “rousting and arresting people thought to cause public disorder, field interrogations 
and roadblock checks, surveillance of suspicious people, vigorous enforcement of public order and 
nuisance laws, and, in general, much greater attention to the minor crimes and disturbances thought 
to disrupt and displease the civil public”). 
43
 Grant, id., at para. 41 
44
 Id.  
45
 Id., at para. 42.  
46
 Id. As we discuss infra, note 145, anything more than a fleeting touch would likely result 
in detention by means of physical restraint. 
47
 Id.  
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reasonable person, for example, would feel free to walk away after a po-
lice officer points at him or her and issues an authoritative command to 
“get out of your car”!48  
In conclusion, the Court in Grant set out the following useful sum-
mary: 
… In cases where there is no physical restraint or legal obligation, it 
may not be clear whether a person has been detained. To determine 
whether the reasonable person in the individual’s circumstances would 
conclude that he or she had been deprived by the state of the liberty of 
choice, the court may consider, inter alia, the following factors: 
(a)  The circumstances giving rise to the encounter as would 
reasonably be perceived by the individual: whether the police were 
providing general assistance; maintaining general order; making 
general inquiries regarding a particular occurrence; or, singling out 
the individual for focused investigation. 
(b)  The nature of the police conduct, including the language used; the 
use of physical contact; the place where the interaction occurred; 
the presence of others; and the duration of the encounter. 
(c)  The particular characteristics or circumstances of the individual 
where relevant, including age; physical stature; minority status; 
level of sophistication.49 
In considering these factors, trial judges must keep in mind “all the 
circumstances of the case”50 and engage in “a realistic appraisal of the 
entire interaction as it developed, not a minute parsing of words and 
movements”.51 But while the trial judge’s findings of fact are owed def-
erence on appeal, the “application of the law to the facts is a question of 
law”.52 Given the number of factors that a trial judge must take into ac-
count, the potential for reviewable error seems considerable. 
3. Applying the Grant Factors in R. v. Grant and R. v. Suberu 
Applying the factors discussed above, the Supreme Court concluded 
that there was a detention in Grant. Mr. Grant, a young black man, was 
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walking on the sidewalk of a Toronto street at midday when, according to 
two plainclothes police officers, his manner and clothing attracted their 
attention. The plainclothes officers requested that a nearby uniformed 
officer “have a chat” with Mr. Grant. The uniformed officer approached 
Mr. Grant head-on and stopped directly in his path. The officer asked Mr. 
Grant “what was going on”, and requested his name and address. In re-
sponse, Mr. Grant produced a provincial health card. At one point, Mr. 
Grant, behaving nervously, adjusted his jacket, prompting the officer to 
tell him to “keep his hands in front of him”. By this time, the two plain-
clothes officers had also approached, flashed their badges and stood 
behind the uniformed officer. Pointed questions followed, with Mr. Grant 
being asked if he was carrying anything that he “shouldn’t have”, an ex-
change that culminated in Mr. Grant admitting that he was in possession 
of marijuana and a firearm and being arrested.  
The preliminary approach and general questioning of Mr. Grant was 
not enough to trigger a detention, the Court found, because “a reasonable 
person would not have concluded he or she was being deprived of the right 
to choose how to act”.53 But a detention arose, the Court ruled, when the 
uniformed officer told him to “keep his hands in front of him”.54 While in 
some cases such a statement might be viewed merely as a “precautionary 
directive”,55 here the encounter was “inherently intimidating”.56 This con-
clusion was buttressed, the Court reasoned, by the arrival of two additional 
police officers who flashed their badges before taking up “tactical posi-
tions”; the fact that Mr. Grant was being singled out; the posing of probing, 
interrogative questions; and Mr. Grant’s youth and inexperience.  
Contrast this with the facts in Suberu.57 There, a police officer at-
tended at a liquor (“LCBO”) store in response to reports that two 
suspects were attempting to use a stolen credit card. On entering the 
store, the officer saw another police officer speaking with a store em-
ployee and another man. At this point, Mr. Suberu walked past the officer 
towards the exit and told him, “he did this, not me, so I guess I can go.” 
The officer followed Mr. Suberu outside and said, “Wait a minute. I need 
to talk to you before you go anywhere.” While Mr. Suberu was seated in 
the driver’s seat of a van, but turned outwards, facing the officer, there 
was a brief exchange during which the officer asked about Mr. Suberu’s 
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relationship to the man inside the store, where the two men had come 
from, and who owned the van. As they spoke, the officer received further 
information over his radio linking the van and Mr. Suberu to the use of a 
stolen credit card at other locations earlier in the day (a Wal-Mart and an 
LCBO store). The officer then asked for Mr. Suberu’s identification and 
vehicle ownership. As he did so, he saw shopping bags inside the van 
from Wal-Mart and the LCBO and arrested Mr. Suberu.  
Applying the Grant factors, the Supreme Court upheld the trial 
judge’s conclusion that Mr. Suberu was not detained before his arrest.58 
The Court began by noting that when police believe a crime has recently 
been committed, they “may engage in preliminary questioning of by-
standers without giving rise to a detention under ss. 9 and 10 of the 
Charter”.59 While the “line between general questioning and focused 
interrogation amounting to detention may be difficult to draw in particu-
lar cases”, the Court concluded that the trial judge’s “findings on the 
facts, supported by the evidence” lead to the conclusion that the officer’s 
questions were merely “exploratory” and he had “not yet zeroed in on the 
individual as someone whose movements must be controlled”.60  
The Court also considered the words used by the officer (“wait a 
minute, I need to talk to you before you go anywhere”). On their face, 
the Court observed, these words were equivocal. On the one hand, they 
might mean “I need to talk to you to get more information”; on the other, 
they could be interpreted “as an order not to leave, suggestive of putting 
Mr. Suberu under police control”.61 The Court preferred the former inter-
pretation, emphasizing that the officer made no move to obstruct Mr. 
Suberu’s movements, Mr. Suberu remained seated in the van while he 
spoke with the officer, and the encounter was “very brief”.62 
The trial judge’s conclusion, the Court concluded, was also sup-
ported by the lack of evidence regarding Mr. Suberu’s “personal 
circumstances, feelings or knowledge”.63 Because he did not testify, 
“there was no evidence as to whether he subjectively believed that he 
could not leave”.64 Without such evidence, the Court was left with the 
evidence of the police officer who testified that he was merely “exploring 
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the situation”, Mr. Suberu never told him he did not wish to speak, and 
their conversation was not “strained”.65  
The Court thus dismissed the claim that Mr. Suberu’s section 10(b) 
Charter rights were violated by the officer, who had proceeded to ques-
tion him without apprising him of his right to counsel.  
4. Problems with the Grant Test  
While appellate courts undoubtedly appreciate their nuance, the kind 
of open-ended, multi-factored standards developed in Grant create at 
least three problems. First, compared to bright-line rules, they give insuf-
ficient guidance to police, who must often make snap decisions in 
quickly unfolding (and sometimes dangerous) circumstances.66 It is sim-
ply unrealistic to expect police to consider a host of situationally variable 
factors in deciding whether they have crossed the detention threshold. As 
a consequence, their decisions will frequently be wrong (in relation to 
what a court will or would have decided ex ante).67 In some cases, they 
will incorrectly decide that they have not detained an individual. In many 
of these cases, these mistakes will cause Charter violations, because po-
lice either had no legal authority to detain (thereby violating section 9) or 
failed to issue the required section 10 cautions. Indeed, as noted above, if 
police are (wrongly) confident that they have not detained a suspect, they 
have little reason to comply with section 10 (especially section 10(b)). If 
the Charter is violated in one of these ways, harm is caused to both de-
tainees and the state. Detainees suffer the liberty and self-incrimination 
harms that these Charter rights are meant to protect against, and the state 
suffers from the diminished probability that factually guilty suspects will 
be convicted (because unconstitutionally obtained evidence may be ex-
cluded at trial under section 24(2) of the Charter). 
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A complete account of the harm to detainees generated by Charter 
violations of this kind must also acknowledge the phenomenon of dis-
criminatory profiling.68 It is now widely recognized that the exercise of 
police discretion may sometimes be motivated, consciously or subcon-
sciously, by nefarious considerations, like an individual’s age, economic 
circumstances, ethnicity or race.69 For example, in recent years a growing 
body of evidence has emerged strongly suggesting that both Aborigi-
nals70 and African Canadians71 are stopped by police at dispropor-
tionately higher rates than members of other racial groups.72  
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Responding to this evidence, two provincial appellate courts have re-
cently acknowledged the existence of racial profiling,73 which the 
Ontario Court of Appeal has defined as 
that phenomenon whereby certain criminal activity is attributed to an 
identified group in society on the basis of race or colour resulting in the 
targeting of individual members of that group. In this context, race is 
illegitimately used as a proxy for the criminality or general criminal 
propensity of an entire racial group. The attitude underlying racial 
profiling is one that may be consciously or unconsciously held. That is, 
the police officer need not be an overt racist. His or her conduct may be 
based on subconscious racial stereotyping.74  
Of course, in the individual case, establishing that race improperly75 
influenced a police officer’s decision to detain or arrest is no easy task.76 
As a result, successful claims of discriminatory profiling remain extraordi-
narily rare in criminal proceedings.77 Nevertheless, the empirical evidence 
makes plain that the impact of erroneous police decisions that have not 
triggered a detention will fall disproportionately on visible minorities. In 
other words, the inherent uncertainty of the Grant approach to detention 
unfortunately tends to make racial profiling more, not less, likely.78  
The second problem with Grant’s open-ended approach is that it will 
likely be applied in a manner that, on average, undervalues individuals’ 
Charter-protected interests. As mentioned, police have a strong incentive 
to avoid warning suspects of their right to counsel.79 Because the line 
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between detention and non-detention is blurry, and the prospect of evi-
dentiary exclusion distant and uncertain, this incentive will often tempt 
police to stretch the boundary of non-detention past its breaking point.80 
That risk will be especially great when police are engaged in community 
policing efforts and their primary concern is the maintenance of order 
rather than collecting admissible evidence for prosecution.81  
Finally, in the few cases that do go to trial, judges also have strong 
incentives to avoid evidentiary exclusion. As discussed above, an inher-
ent selection bias presents mostly factually guilty defendants to the 
courts. The benefits of evidentiary exclusion (encouraging police com-
pliance with Charter norms, protecting individual liberty against 
unjustified state interference, and disassociating courts from police mal-
feasance) are distant, systemic and ephemeral. The cost (the potential 
acquittal of the factually guilty), in contrast, is immediate, direct and vis-
ceral. In this milieu, the flexibility of the Grant factors will most often 
inure to the benefit of the state. With a reviewing court’s focus dispersed 
over a long list of relevant considerations, the coercive nature of a dy-
namic encounter can easily become obscured.82  
In our view, this is precisely what happened in Suberu, where the 
Court arguably ignored Grant’s admonition to engage in “a realistic 
appraisal of the entire interaction as it developed, not a minute parsing 
of words and movements”.83 Recall that the majority interpreted the 
statement “wait a minute, I need to talk to you before you go any-
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where” as a mere request for information.84 However, as Binnie J. per-
suasively argued in dissent, viewing that comment in context makes the 
officer’s meaning plain:  
The verbal exchange between Constable Roughley and Mr. Suberu 
clearly established an unambiguous police order. When Mr. Suberu 
walked past Constable Roughley, saying, “He did this, not me, so I 
guess I can go”, and Constable Roughley replied, “Wait a minute. I 
need to talk to you before you go anywhere”, it was a command to stay 
put. Constable Roughley’s words were only ambiguous if one ignores 
the preceding remark from Mr. Suberu. Constable Roughley was 
replying to Mr. Suberu, who had essentially said, “Can I leave?”, by 
essentially saying, “No”. It was clear to Mr. Suberu that he was not free 
to go “anywhere” and any reasonable person in that position would 
have come to the same conclusion.85  
The majority’s approach was no doubt motivated by the practical dif-
ficulties of implementing the right to counsel incidental to investigation 
detention.86 But the Court’s solution to this problem — defining deten-
tion so amorphously that it need not capture all situations where 
reasonable people would believe that they were “not free to go and had 
to comply with the police direction or demand”87 — it is akin to killing 
the patient to cure a cold. While it avoids the impracticality of complying 
with section 10(b) of the Charter, in the process it immunizes a host of 
highly coercive encounters from scrutiny under section 9. As we discuss 
below, there are other solutions to the section 10(b) problem that would 
allow police to engage in brief, preliminary questioning without issuing 
the section 10(b) caution.  
The final problem posed by the Grant factors is that, even if judges do 
find a detention, the flexibility of the exclusionary discretion under section 
24(2) of the Charter (also reformulated by the Court in Grant) provides 
ample opportunity to excuse police mistakes. Certainly deliberate and neg-
ligent Charter violations are likely to result in exclusion.88 Where police 
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(unintentionally) err in applying indeterminate legal standards, however, 
courts often decline to exclude under section 24(2). In Grant, the Court 
noted that “the point at which an encounter becomes a detention is not al-
ways clear, and is something with which courts have struggled”.89 Since 
police there were “operating in circumstances of considerable legal uncer-
tainty,” their failure to comply with section 10(b) was “understandable”, 
tipping the “balance in favour of admission”.90 Making the rules clearer for 
police will reduce that uncertainty; police compliance with Charter stan-
dards would then become more likely,91 as would the potential for a 
remedy in those cases where an individual’s rights are violated. 
5. Reform 
How might this situation be improved? In short, the courts should 
interpret and apply Grant in a manner that provides as much ex ante 
certainty to police as possible. In that regard, the experience in provin-
cial appellate courts after Therens92 is instructive. Shortly after Therens 
was decided, the Ontario Court of Appeal articulated a test for deten-
tion that is similar in many ways to the approach in Grant. In R. v. 
Moran, Martin J.A. set out a list of relevant criteria in a case involving 
an accused interviewed by police at the station-house on two separate 
occasions during the course of a homicide investigation.93 The Moran 
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criteria were adopted by most courts of appeal94 and applied to many 
different types of police-suspect encounters, including the questioning of 
pedestrians.95  
At first glance, the Moran approach appears at least as open-ended 
and indeterminate as Grant. A close look at the jurisprudence, however, 
reveals that most often (including in Moran itself) detention turned on 
the (related) fourth, fifth and sixth factors, namely, the stage of the inves-
tigation, the degree of suspicion attaching to the accused and the nature 
of the questioning.96  
Before Grant, a detention was usually found when police identified 
the accused as the likely perpetrator and conducted questioning with a 
view to inducing self-incriminating statements.97 When both of these 
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 See, e.g., R. v. B. (L.), [2007] O.J. No. 3290, 227 C.C.C. (3d) 70 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. H. 
(C.R.), id.; R. v. Grafe, supra, note 27; R. v. Hall, [1995] O.J. No. 544, 22 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.); 
R. v. V. (T.A.), id. 
96
 For example, writing for the Manitoba Court of Appeal in H. (C.R.), Steele J. held that 
police did not detain a pedestrian even though they asked for his identification and checked his name 
against a computer database. See R. v. H. (C.R.), supra, note 94. See also R. v. B. (L.), id., at para. 67 
(request for pedestrian’s identity and running of database check did not trigger detention). Subse-
quently, Steele J. concluded for the same court in R. v. Dolynchuck, [2004] M.J. No. 135, 184 C.C.C. 
(3d) 214, at para. 32 (Man. C.A.) that police did detain the accused when they questioned him in a 
parking lot after receiving a tip that he had been driving while impaired. Police had more than a 
mere suspicion that he had committed this offence, indicated that they would have detained him for 
investigative purposes after they confirmed his identity, and asked him a question (“were you driv-
ing?”), the answer to which provided proof of an element of the offence. Police had “already decided 
that a crime had been committed and that the accused was the perpetrator” and their question was 
designed to obtain “incriminating statements”.   
97
 See, e.g., R. v. Voss, supra, note 94, at 204 (“the police investigation changed from one of 
trying to determine a cause of death to one of trying to get information from a man who is alleged to 
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conditions were present, a detention was usually triggered even when 
suspects were told that they were free to leave or to decline answering 
questions.98 Conversely, when one of these conditions was not present 
(such as accusatory questioning), a detention was usually not found even 
if police had grounds to detain or arrest at the conclusion of question-
ing.99 It thus appeared that while courts formally applied an open-ended, 
“totality of the circumstances” approach, like that endorsed in Grant, the 
results in actual cases were dictated by a (relatively) “bright-line” stan-
dard. In all but a few cases, detention was found when (and only when), 
police attempted to elicit incriminating statements from the likely perpe-
trator of the offence under investigation.100  
To be clear, we do not mean to argue that the Moran criteria, as nar-
rowed and refined in subsequent cases, should be resurrected to replace 
the various factors identified in Grant. In fact, as we detail below, the 
controlling considerations that emerged in Moran are under-inclusive 
because they fail to provide any protection where the police have no of-
fence in mind but are instead engaged in an invasive fishing expedition, 
as they were in Grant.101 The Moran factors were developed with section 
                                                                                                             
have and has admitted to having assaulted his wife in order to determine if he was implicated in the 
death”); R. v. Pomeroy, [2008] O.J. No. 2550, 2008 ONCA 521, at para. 37 (Ont. C.A.) (“The focus 
of the interview was to gain general information as part of the investigation of the ‘suspicious death’; 
the questioning was not conducted for the purpose of obtaining incriminating statements from the 
appellant”); R. v. Caputo, supra, note 94, at para. 27 (“The questioning up to that point appears to 
have been general in nature and directed toward obtaining a witness statement from the appellant. He 
had not yet been confronted with evidence pointing to his guilt or to the contradictions between his 
statements and the other evidence that was being gathered as the investigation continued”).  
98
 See R. v. Johns, supra, note 94, at para. 28 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Teske, [2005] O.J. No. 3759, 
202 O.A.C. 239, at para. 55 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Rajaratnam, [2006] A.J. No. 1373, 214 C.C.C. (3d) 
547, at para. 17 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Lee, [2007] A.J. No. 1183, 2007 ABCA 337 (Alta. C.A.).  
99
 See R. v. Pomeroy, supra, note 97, at para. 37; R. v. Hall, [2004] O.J. No. 5007, 193 
O.A.C. 7, at para. 22 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. B. (L.), supra, note 95, at paras. 56-57. 
100
 This test is similar to that set out in R. v. Hawkins, [1992] N.J. No. 147, 14 C.R. (4th) 286 
(Nfld. C.A.), revd [1993] S.C.J. No. 50, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.), but without reference to the 
intention of police to arrest or charge suspects. See also Tim Quigley, Procedure in Canadian 
Criminal Law, 2d ed. (looseleaf) (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2006) § 5.3(c)(ii) [hereinafter “Quig-
ley”]; Tanovich, “Elshaw”, supra, note 66, at 380; Stuart, supra, note 8, at 326-27; Penney, 
“Triggering the Right, supra, note 67, at 284-85; Steven Penney, “What’s Wrong with Self-
Incrimination? The Wayward Path of Self-Incrimination Law in the Post-Charter Era, Part 2: Self-
Incrimination in Police Investigations” (2004) 48 Crim. L.Q. 280, at 320-21 [hereinafter “Penney, 
‘What’s Wrong?’”]. 
101
 This is the principal reason why we also disagree with Binnie J.’s proposed approach for 
defining detention, which would emphasize the perception and intention of police. See Grant, supra, 
note 1, at para. 180, Binnie J., concurring. We worry that in the hands of lower court judges, a police 
officer’s assertion that “I didn’t suspect the accused of anything, I was just having a chat” would too 
easily allow highly coercive encounters to avoid being labelled detentions. We are especially con-
cerned about certain so-called “community policing programs”, like the Toronto Anti-Violence 
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10 of the Charter in mind and are most relevant to formal, “sit down” 
interviews conducted at the police station or other suitable location. They 
were not designed to address the section 9 liberty interests implicated by 
impromptu, “in the field” inquiries of pedestrians, motorists, and the like. 
We reference Moran’s treatment only to stress that not all factors under a 
multi-factor approach are deserving of equal emphasis. By focusing on 
                                                                                                             
Intervention Strategy (“TAVIS”). TAVIS is a relatively recent initiative of the Toronto Police Ser-
vice. Its stated purpose (“an intensive, violence reduction and community mobilization strategy 
intended to reduce crime and increase safety in our neighbourhoods”) is laudable. See Toronto Po-
lice Service, TAVIS, available online: <http://www.torontopolice.on.ca/tavis>. In practice, however, 
it involves large teams of police officers proactively policing “high-crime” neighbourhoods and 
engaging in aggressive stop and frisk practices. Those stopped are asked to produce identification 
and routinely searched. Individuals who are in possession of drugs or weapons are arrested, as are 
those for whom there are outstanding warrants or who happen to be breaching the terms of a bail or 
probation order. For others, the encounter often only ends after the police have completed a “contact 
card”, known within the Toronto Police Service as a “208 card”. See Timothy Appleby, “New police 
strategy designed to blanket high-violence areas”, The Globe and Mail, February 13, 2006, A1; 
Moira Welsh, “Elite Toronto police squad goes looking for trouble”, Toronto Star (February 8, 
2010) available online: <http://www.thestar.com/specialsections/raceandcrime/article/761310--elite-
toronto-police-squad-goes-looking-for-trouble>. 
The use of these cards was explained by LaForme J. in R. v. Ferdinand, [2004] O.J. No. 3209, 
21 C.R. (6th) 65, at paras. 12, 16 (Ont. S.C.J.): 
A 208 card is approximately 3” by 5” and is printed on both sides, commencing with the 
words, “Person Investigated”. It records information obtained from a person who is 
stopped by the police that includes information such as, “name, aliases, date of birth, col-
our, address, and contact location including the time”. On the back it has entries for 
things such as: “associates” and “associated with: gang, motorcycle club, Drug Treatment 
Court”. The police then input the information from the completed 208 cards into a police 
computer database for their future reference.  
. . . . . 
There is no evidence that any police officer advises, or has ever advised, any person 
stopped that they have a right not to answer any questions from this card and that they are 
free to leave if they wish. The testimony of the two young men from the neighbourhood 
is that: The police “always stop them, and always search them”, and they are not told they 
do not have to answer. They add that, persons stopped by these two officers always an-
swer questions and submit to searches because they believe they have to, and that it does 
not do any good not to. 
It is fair to say that LaForme J. was troubled by the way in which these cards were being used. 
In a rather prescient comment, he noted that the “impression that one could draw from the informa-
tion sought on these 208 cards — along with the current manner in which they are being used — is 
that they could be a tool utilized for racial profiling”. Id., at para. 21.  
In 2010, the Toronto Star gained access, by means of a freedom of information request, to the 
data compiled by Toronto police using the 208 cards. See Toronto Police Services Board v. Ontario 
(Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2009] O.J. No. 90, 93 O.R. (3d) 563 (Ont. C.A.). After 
analyzing the data, which includes racial descriptors of the persons stopped and questioned, the 
Toronto Star reported that black males between the ages of 15 and 24 are 2.5 times more likely to be 
stopped and documented than white males the same age. See Jim Rankin, “Race Matters: Blacks 
documented by police at high rate” Toronto Star (February 6, 2010), online: <http://www.thestar. 
com/specialsections/raceandcrime/article/761343--race-matters-blacks-documented-by-police-at-
high-rate>. 
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the key variables identified in Grant, courts can both give police clear 
guidance and achieve a more optimal accommodation between the con-
flicting interests implicated by police-citizen encounters.  
Of course, this raises the questions: which of the Grant factors are 
most important to achieving this accommodation and what guidance 
should courts give to the police in future cases? In the aftermath of 
Grant, we would emphasize two variables: 
(1) The language used to initiate the encounter. Permissive language 
would be far less likely to result in a detention than obligatory lan-
guage. For example, in the context of a street stop, “I’d like to speak 
with you” or “Would you mind if I asked you some questions?” 
would be unlikely to result in a detention. A detention would likely 
arise, in contrast, from “Stay right there!”, “Freeze!”, or “Show me 
some identification!”102 Similarly, for “sit down” interviews, “I’d 
like to speak with you at a time and place of your choosing” is less 
likely to trigger detention than, “We want you to come with us to the 
police station to talk about this right now.”103  
(2) The nature of any ensuing questioning. Purely exploratory questions 
are unlikely to trigger detention. By this we would include situations 
such as a police officer approaching a pedestrian and asking, “How are 
things?” or an officer responding to an emergency call and asking 
someone present, “What’s going on?” In contrast, detention is much 
more likely to be found when police approach a pedestrian, ask for 
identification, and ask questions like, “Where are you coming from?”, 
“What are you doing?”, “Where are you going?” or “Do you have any 
                                                                                                             
102
 Unfortunately, Grant did not address whether a police demand for identification results in 
a detention. When police asked Mr. Grant for his name and address, he produced his provincial 
health card without a police request, so the question did not arise. A number of pre-Grant cases 
suggest that such a request does not result in a detention. See R. v. B. (L.), supra, note 95; R. v. Hall, 
supra, note 95, at paras. 21-23; R. v. H. (C.R.), supra, note 94, at paras. 33-36. Post-Grant, it remains 
to be seen how this question will be resolved. Obviously, police must be free to approach people and 
engage them in conversation, which includes the social pleasantry of asking someone’s name. Few 
would feel compelled to remain in a police officer’s presence because of such a routine and benign 
question. But a police request for identification is undoubtedly different. Given a police officer’s 
position of authority, most people would not hesitate in complying with what they would reasonably 
perceive as a demand. And, surely, once a police officer is holding your identification (especially if 
while doing so simultaneously peppering you with questions regarding where you are coming from, 
where you are going, whether you have anything in your possession that you shouldn’t, etc.), most 
people would not think that they are free to leave. 
103
 See Moran, supra, note 92, at 258 (stressing scrutiny of language used in requesting per-
son to come to the police station and “whether the accused was given a choice or expressed a 
preference that the interview be conducted at the police station, rather than at his or her home”). 
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weapons or drugs?” In the latter circumstances, few reasonable people 
would feel free to walk away. Similarly, in a more formal interview 
context, a detention would not likely arise from open-ended, non-
accusatory questions designed to gather preliminary information; 
questions designed to elicit self-incriminating evidence from someone 
strongly suspected of committing a crime likely would. 
The first of these variables targets the liberty interests inhering in sec-
tion 9,104 the second aims to protect the interests inhering in section 10(b) 
— preventing inquisitorial abuses and compelled self-incrimination.105 
Each also allows police to seek preliminary investigative information with-
out significant restraint. It follows that a detention should usually be found 
when either of these factors points in that direction. If courts were to re-
quire both, one of these Charter-protected interests would frequently be 
left unprotected. Without factor (1), as long as they do not engage in inter-
rogation-like questioning, police could coercively restrain people’s 
freedom without reasonable suspicion that they have committed a crime. 
And without factor (2), as long as they do not coercively restrain people’s 
freedom, police could conduct accusatory (and potentially abusive) inter-
rogations, again without reasonable suspicion and without extending the 
protections of the right to counsel.  
In addition to enabling a better balance between individual and law 
enforcement interests, our proposal gives police much more concrete 
guidance than the open-ended Grant factors. In short, it tells them that if 
they do not want to detain, they should use permissive language and re-
frain from interrogating. Conversely, it warns them that if they use 
compulsory language to initiate encounters with suspects or engage in 
the functional equivalent of an interrogation, they will likely have trig-
gered a detention and must thus comply with sections 9, 10(a) and 
(subject to any changes to the law that we advocate for below) 10(b) of 
the Charter. In other words, they must have reasonable grounds to sus-
pect an individual of being involved in a recently committed or unfolding 
criminal offence, tell that person why he or she has been detained, and 
                                                                                                             
104
 In Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 20, the Court finally took the opportunity to expressly 
acknowledge the purpose underlying this important Charter right, which it recognized as being, 
“broadly put … to protect individual liberty from unjustified state interference”. Rather remarkably, 
even though s. 9 of the Charter had been before the Court on 24 prior occasions, it has never before 
expressly identified its purpose. See Stribopoulos, “The Forgotten Right”, supra, note 8, at 214-23.  
105
 See Suberu, supra, note 2, at para. 40; R. v. Manninen, [1987] S.C.J. No. 41, [1987] 1 
S.C.R. 1233, at 1242-43 (S.C.C.); R. v. Brydges, [1990] S.C.J. No. 8, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190, at 203, 
206, 215 (S.C.C.); R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173, at 191 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Prosper, supra, note 17, at 271. 
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inform the person of the right to retain and instruct counsel without de-
lay.  
As mentioned, the Court suggested in Grant that if the police want to 
avoid engaging these various Charter rights, there is a relatively simple 
solution: tell the affected individual in unambiguous terms that he or she 
is under no obligation to answer questions and is free to go. This sugges-
tion, we caution, should be read very strictly. In the context of brief “in 
the field” inquiries, such a statement would likely be enough to convey 
to most people that they are truly not required to cooperate. In the con-
text of accusatory questioning at the police station (and perhaps other “sit 
down” interviews), something more may be required to impress upon 
suspects that they are not under legal constraint.106 It would be prudent, 
for example, to require suspects in such circumstances to read, under-
stand and sign a statement (perhaps repeatedly in the case of lengthy 
interviews) clearly explaining that they are legally entitled to leave or 
remain silent.  
III. INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION AND SECTION 10 OF THE CHARTER 
1. History and Context 
As noted, the reforms to Grant’s conception of non-legal psycho-
logical detention that we have proposed do not address the problem of 
applying the section 10(b) right to counsel to suspects lawfully detained 
for investigative purposes. Before 1993, police had no power to detain 
short of carrying out a formal arrest.107 All this changed with the Court of 
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 See the cases cited supra, note 98 (finding detention in the context of accusatory “sit 
down” interviews despite police statements that suspects were free to leave or remain silent). 
107
 See R. v. Hicks, [1988] O.J. No. 957, 42 C.C.C. (3d) 394, at 400 (Ont. C.A.), affd on 
other grounds [1990] S.C.J. No. 7, 54 C.C.C. (3d) 575 (S.C.C.); R. v. Moran, supra, note 92, at 258; 
R. v. Esposito, [1985] O.J. No. 1002, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 88, at 94 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused 
[1986] S.C.C.A. No. 63, [1986] 1 S.C.R. viii (S.C.C.); R. v. Dedman, [1981] O.J. No. 2993, 59 
C.C.C. (2d) 97, at 108-109 (Ont. C.A.), affd on other grounds [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, 20 C.C.C. (3d) 
97 (S.C.C.); R. v. Cluett, [1982] N.S.J. No. 542, 3 C.C.C. (3d) 333, at 347-48 (Ont. C.A.), revd on 
other grounds [1985] S.C.J. No. 54, 21 C.C.C. (3d) 318 (S.C.C.); R. v. Guthrie, [1982] A.J. No. 29, 
69 C.C.C. (2d) 216, at 218-19 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Moore, [1978] S.C.J. No. 82, 43 C.C.C. (2d) 83, at 
89-90 (S.C.C.); Rice v. Connolly, [1966] 2 Q.B. 414, at 419 (C.A.); Kenlin v. Gardner, [1967] 2 
Q.B. 510 (C.A.); Koechlin v. Waugh, [1957] O.J. No. 105, 118 C.C.C. 24, at 26-27 (Ont. C.A.); Alan 
Young, “All Along The Watchtower: Arbitrary Detention and the Police Function” (1991) 29 Os-
goode Hall L.J. 329, at 330, 343; David C. McDonald, Legal Rights in the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1989), at 303-304; Law Reform Commission of 
Canada, Arrest (Working Paper 41) (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1985), at 33, 37; Steve 
Coughlan, “Police Detention: A Proposal” (1985) 28 Crim. L.Q. 64, at 66, 77. 
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Appeal for Ontario’s decision in Simpson.108 The Simpson court used the 
ancillary powers doctrine to recognize a power to briefly detain when 
police have “articulable cause” to believe that the person is involved in 
criminal activity.109 
The investigative detention power recognized in Simpson was ulti-
mately endorsed by appellate courts across the country.110 It took 11 
years, however, for the Supreme Court of Canada to finally give it its 
stamp of approval. Acknowledging that “police officers must be empow-
ered to respond quickly, effectively, and flexibly to the diversity of 
encounters experienced daily on the front lines of policing”, in R. v. 
Mann the Court applied the ancillary powers doctrine to recognize an 
investigative detention power.111 
In Mann, the Court held that an individual may be briefly detained 
where police have reasonable grounds to suspect a clear nexus between 
the individual being detained and a recently committed or still unfolding 
criminal offence.112 An investigative detention that is carried out in ac-
cordance with this common law power, the Court explained, is not 
“arbitrary” and thus does not infringe section 9 of the Charter.113 
The Court also held that where suspects are lawfully detained for in-
vestigative purposes, police may conduct a limited protective pat-down 
search. “Such a search power does not exist as a matter of course”, the 
Court explained, “the officer must believe on reasonable grounds that his 
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 Supra, note 8. 
109
 Id., at 499-502. 
110
 See R. v. Ferris, [1998] B.C.J. No. 1415, 126 C.C.C. (3d) 298 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Dupuis, 
[1994] A.J. No. 1011, 162 A.R. 197 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Lake, [1996] S.J. No. 886, 113 C.C.C. (3d) 
208 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. G. (C.M.), [1996] M.J. No. 428, 113 Man. R. (2d) 76 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Pi-
geon, [1993] J.Q. no 1683, 59 Q.A.C. 103 (Que. C.A.); R. v. Carson, [1998] N.B.J. No. 482, 39 
M.V.R. (3d) 55 (N.B.C.A.); R. v. Chabot, [1993] N.S.J. No. 465, 86 C.C.C. (3d) 309 (N.S.C.A.); R. 
v. Burke, [1997] N.J. No. 187, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 59 (Nfld. C.A.). 
111
 R. v. Mann, supra, note 7, at para. 16. 
112
 Id., at paras. 34, 45. Unfortunately, the Court could have been clearer on whether the in-
vestigative detention power identified was limited to crimes actually known to police or whether it 
also extends to crimes that are reasonably suspected. The latter explanation makes much more sense 
as it allows police to respond to events that they observe while on patrol giving rise to a reasonably 
based suspicion that criminality may be afoot. See R. v. Nesbeth, [2008] O.J. No. 3086, 238 C.C.C. 
(3d) 567, at para. 18 (Ont. C.A.) (“While the court in Mann speaks of reasonable grounds to suspect 
that the individual is connected to ‘a particular crime’, in my view, it is not necessary that the offi-
cers be able to pinpoint the crime with absolute precision.”); R. v. Yeh, [2009] S.J. No. 582, 2009 
SKCA 112, [2009] 11 W.W.R. 193, at para. 84 (Sask. C.A.) (“a ‘particular crime,’ read in context, 
reflects the idea that the police may not detain an individual out of a general sense he or she might be 
doing something unlawful. … police suspicions must relate to specific criminal wrongdoing”). 
113
 Mann, id., at para. 20.  
464 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
or her own safety, or the safety of others, is at risk”.114 Accordingly, po-
lice are not permitted (as they did in Mann) to search for evidence.115  
Before Mann, there was no clear and consistent answer as to whether 
section 10(a) and (b) of the Charter apply when an individual is subject 
to investigative detention.116 In Mann, the Supreme Court thankfully 
made clear that section 10(a) of the Charter does apply. The Court  
explained that the police must tell the person “in clear and simple  
language” of the reasons for the detention.117 Unfortunately, the same 
was not true for section 10(b). Although the Supreme Court cautioned in 
Mann that the police should not use compliance with that right as an  
excuse to unduly and artificially prolong an investigative detention, it 
deliberately deferred for another day the more pressing question of 
whether or not the right applies.118 It took five more years of uncertainty 
before that day arrived.  
2. Suberu, Investigative Detention and Section 10(b) of the Charter 
As mentioned, in Suberu the Supreme Court of Canada definitively 
held that, “subject to concerns for officer or public safety”, police must tell 
people subject to investigative detention about their right to retain and in-
struct counsel immediately upon detention and must do everything 
required under section 10(b) to facilitate that right.119 It summarily dis-
missed the suggestion that a suspension of the right to counsel during such 
detentions was justified under section 1 of the Charter, which subjects sec-
tion 10(b) and other Charter rights to “reasonable limits prescribed by law 
                                                                                                             
114
 Id., at para. 40. 
115
 Id., at paras. 40-45 (any probing beyond a pat-down for weapons is only justifiable where 
a police officer feels something during the initial protective search that raises reasonably based 
safety concerns). See also R. v. Duong, [2006] B.C.J. No. 1452, 142 C.R.R. (2d) 261, at para. 56 
(B.C.C.A.); R. v. Greaves, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1953, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 305 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. White, 
[2007] O.J. No. 1605, 85 O.R. (3d) 407 (Ont. C.A.). 
116
 See, e.g., R. v. V. (T.A.), supra, note 94, at para. 32 (Alta. C.A.) (“When a brief search is 
conducted to ensure the safety of the officers involved, it seems implausible that this must be pre-
ceded by a 10(b) warning”); R. v. Lewis, [1998] O.J. No. 376, 122 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at para. 28 (Ont. 
C.A.) (“Without deciding whether every investigative detention requires compliance with s. 10(b), I 
would hold that this investigative detention, which encompassed a search of the respondent’s lug-
gage, gave rise to an obligation that the police inform the respondent of his right to counsel.”) 
117
 Mann, supra, note 7, at para. 21. 
118
 Id., at para. 22. 
119
 Suberu, supra, note 2, at paras. 2, 42. See also R. v. Strachan, [1988] S.C.J. No. 94, 
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 980, at 998-99 (S.C.C.) (s. 10 warnings must be given immediately upon detention 
but may be delayed in situations where police need to gain control over a dangerous situation); R. v. 
Debot, [1989] S.C.J. No. 118, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140, at 1163-64 (S.C.C.), Wilson J. (same). 
(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)  DETENTION UNDER THE CHARTER 465 
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”. “Be-
cause the definition of detention, as understood in these reasons, gives the 
police leeway to engage members of the public in non-coercive, explora-
tory questioning without necessarily triggering their Charter rights relating 
to detention,” the Court reasoned, “s. 1 need not be invoked in order to 
allow the police to effectively fulfill their investigative duties.”120  
Similarly, the Court rejected the view of the court below that the refer-
ence to “without delay” in section 10(b) contemplated a “brief interlude” 
between the initial investigative detention and the point at which police 
must advise suspects of the right to counsel.121 During this period, the 
Court of Appeal had concluded, police may make “a quick assessment of 
the situation to decide whether anything more than a brief detention of the 
individual may be warranted”.122 The Supreme Court explained: 
To allow for a delay between the outset of a detention and the 
engagement of the police duties under s. 10(b) creates an ill-defined 
and unworkable test of the application of the s. 10(b) right. The right to 
counsel requires a stable and predictable definition. What constitutes a 
permissible delay is abstract and difficult to quantify, whereas the 
concept of immediacy leaves little room for misunderstanding. An 
ill-defined threshold for the application of the right to counsel must be 
avoided, particularly as it relates to a right that imposes specific 
obligations on the police.123 
3. Problems with the Suberu Approach 
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Mann, investigative detention 
“should be brief in duration and does not impose an obligation on the 
detained individual to answer questions posed by the police”.124 It further 
warned that it cannot be allowed to “become a de facto arrest”.125 In light 
of these directives, the Court hinted (though as mentioned it expressly 
declined to decide the issue) that applying section 10(b) of the Charter to 
investigative detention might not be appropriate. “Mandatory compliance 
with [section 10(b)’s] requirements,” it stated, “cannot be transformed 
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into an excuse for prolonging, unduly and artificially, a detention that, as 
I later mention, must be of brief duration.”126 
These dicta were seemingly ignored in Suberu. In our view, applying 
section 10(b) to investigative detention will have bad effects for both law 
enforcement and individual liberty. For law enforcement, complying with 
section 10(b) involves much more than reading a caution card.127 After 
doing so, police must also ensure that detainees understand the caution, 
and if there is any indication that they do not, take steps to facilitate un-
derstanding.128 Critically, police may not question or otherwise seek to 
obtain self-incriminating information from detainees until this under-
standing is achieved.129  
Further, if detainees invoke their right to counsel,130 police must do a 
number of things to facilitate it. They must allow detainees to telephone a 
lawyer in private131 as soon as reasonably possible.132 If private telephone 
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consultation is possible at the place of initial detention (or anywhere a de-
tainee is taken before a police station), it must be provided there.133 If not, 
it must be provided at the station.134 Again, police may not elicit any evi-
dence from the detainee before such access is provided.135 
Once police provide private telephone access, they must give detainees 
a “reasonable opportunity” to talk to a lawyer of their choosing.136 The 
duration of this reasonable opportunity is uncertain, but in many cases it 
may extend for several hours. It may turn on (among other things), the 
availability of duty counsel,137 an urgent need to obtain evidence138 and 
whether detainees were “diligent” in exercising their rights.139 Once again, 
police may not question or obtain self-incriminating information from de-
tainees until this reasonable opportunity has expired.140 Further, if a 
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detainee who wants to talk to a lawyer changes his or her mind before do-
ing so, police must advise him or her of the right “to a reasonable 
opportunity to contact counsel” and of the obligation on police during this 
time frame “not to elicit incriminating evidence”.141  
In many cases, complying with these requirements will dramatically 
increase the duration and intrusiveness of an investigative detention. In-
deed, when detainees invoke their right to counsel, it will frequently be 
impossible to comply with section 10(b) within the “brief” period permit-
ted by investigative detention. Despite the ubiquity of mobile phones and 
24-hour duty counsel, the private consultation and “lawyer of choice” 
requirements will necessitate prolonged detention on the street or at the 
police station in a great many cases. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
warning in Mann, applying section 10(b) would go a long way to trans-
forming investigative detention into “de facto arrest”.142 Many people 
would consequently be subjected to prolonged, custodial detention on the 
basis of a standard (reasonable suspicion) that is markedly lower than the 
grounds required for arrest (reasonable and probable grounds).143 
A further cost of applying section 10(b) to investigative detention is 
the loss of valuable investigative information. Some detainees who exer-
cise their rights (and who would otherwise have cooperated with police) 
will heed their lawyers’ advice to remain silent. As the purpose of inves-
tigative detention is to obtain preliminary information from people 
reasonably suspected of committing criminal offences, and as such in-
formation will often justify the use of further investigative tools (such as 
arrest, searches incident to arrest and the obtaining of search warrants), 
the loss of this information is no small matter.  
As mentioned, the Court’s response to these difficulties was to note 
in Suberu that its definition of detention “gives the police leeway to en-
gage members of the public in non-coercive, exploratory questioning 
without necessarily triggering their Charter rights”.144 However, as we 
have argued, the very flexibility of this definition permits police to im-
pose considerable restraints on individual liberty.  
Further, even if we concede (for the sake of argument) that Grant 
demarcates the optimal line between coercive and non-coercive restraint 
for the category of non-legal psychological detention, there is still the 
matter of detention by physical restraint. There is little jurisprudence on 
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the meaning of this category of detention, likely because it is usually ob-
vious. Though no court has ventured to define it, it appears to encompass 
situations where police take physical control over suspects by handling 
them in a manner that is more than fleeting or trifling.145 So, for example, 
if police grasp an individual’s arms,146 use handcuffs147 or direct a sus-
pect into the back seat of a police cruiser,148 a physical detention 
obviously results. Detention similarly ensues from searching suspects’ 
bodies or clothing, or searching their personal belongings while in their 
presence.149 In any of these circumstances, an analysis as to whether 
there was a psychological detention is unnecessary. Once a police officer 
takes physical control of a suspect, no reasonable person could possibly 
conclude that he or she is still free to walk away.150 
It is therefore clear that if police conduct a protective pat-down search, 
they have triggered a detention and must comply with section 10(b) of the 
Charter. The same occurs any time police touch a suspect151 in a non-
trivial way.152 We take no issue with the need for police to have reasonable 
suspicion and otherwise comply with the requirements for lawful investi-
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gative detention before intruding on suspects’ bodily integrity in these 
ways. Requiring them to comply with section 10(b) of the Charter in all 
such cases, however, would be unwise. Consider a police officer who has 
reasonable suspicion (but not reasonable and probable grounds) that a pe-
destrian has committed an offence. Assume as well that the officer 
reasonably believes that the suspect might be carrying a weapon. The offi-
cer has three choices: (i) approach the suspect to make preliminary 
inquiries without triggering a detention; (ii) effect an investigative deten-
tion; or (iii) leave the suspect alone. Under option (i), the officer would not 
be permitted to conduct a protective pat-down search, thereby risking the 
officer’s own (and perhaps others’) safety. Under option (ii), the officer 
would be forced to comply with section 10(b), thereby risking losing valu-
able evidence and prolonging a potentially innocent person’s detention. 
And under option (iii), an opportunity to obtain evidence of a potential 
crime and apprehend its perpetrator would be lost.  
These and all the other costs of applying section 10(b) of the Charter 
to investigative detention that we have discussed might be worth incur-
ring if they were outweighed by the benefits. In Suberu, the Court 
outlined its concerns about suspending the right to counsel for investiga-
tive detention as follows: 
A situation of vulnerability relative to the state is created at the outset 
of a detention. Thus, the concerns about self-incrimination and the 
interference with liberty that s. 10(b) seeks to address are present as 
soon as a detention is effected. In order to protect against the risk of 
self-incrimination that result from the individuals being deprived of 
their liberty by the state, and in order to assist them in regaining their 
liberty, it is only logical that the phrase “without delay” must be 
interpreted as “immediately”. If the s. 10(b) right to counsel is to serve 
its intended purpose to mitigate the legal disadvantage and legal 
jeopardy faced by detainees, and to assist them in regaining their 
liberty, the police must immediately inform them of the right to counsel 
as soon as the detention arises.153 
This argument is not convincing. The Court itself has recognized in 
many analogous situations that brief detentions accompanied by non-
accusatory questioning do not imperil the interests protected by section 
10(b) of the Charter. It has held that police need not comply with sec-
tion 10(b) in exercising powers to briefly detain motorists to investigate 
driving-related offences. In Thomsen, it concluded that the right to 
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counsel may be denied to drivers subject to breath alcohol screening 
demands.154 It has similarly upheld the denial of the right to counsel to 
drivers questioned about their alcohol consumption or asked to perform 
physical sobriety tests.155 Courts of appeal have also exempted police 
from cautioning drivers156 and passengers157 subject to brief, lawful, 
roadside detentions for general vehicle offence investigations. Simi-
larly, the Court has held that customs officials need not comply with 
section 10(b) when conducting brief, preliminary questioning of people 
entering and leaving Canada.158 
The rationale behind these exemptions from section 10(b) is sim-
ple: complying with section 10(b) in these circumstances would often 
needlessly prolong an individual’s detention and also frustrate investi-
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gations159 while doing little to advance the objectives of the right. In the 
case of roadside screening demands, so long as police follow the rules, 
suspects must either comply or risk criminal punishment for refusal.160 
In the vast majority of cases, talking to a lawyer would not change this 
situation.  
More importantly, affording a right to counsel at this point would do 
little to deter abusive interrogation practices. Brief roadside stops are not 
likely to involve coercive interrogation methods or generate false confes-
sions. As the United States Supreme Court has observed, the brevity and 
public nature of most traffic stops substantially mitigates the risk of this 
kind of abuse.161 The same logic applies to preliminary customs and im-
migration questioning. There is little to be gained (and much to be lost) 
in providing the right to counsel to people subject to routine questioning 
at border crossings. 
So it is for investigative detention. As long as such detentions remain 
limited to their intended scope (brief questioning to quickly confirm or 
refute the reasonably based suspicion that led to the stop), there is no 
need for section 10(b)’s protections. Imposing the right to counsel in 
these circumstances would instead increase the duration and intrusive-
ness of detentions, compromise police and public safety, and deprive 
police of valuable preliminary investigative information. Further, in an 
effort to avoid these consequences, courts will be strongly tempted (as 
the Supreme Court was in Suberu) to avoid finding that a detention has 
arisen despite a substantial intrusion on a person’s liberty.  
4. Reform 
If we are correct that the best policy is to exempt investigative deten-
tion from section 10(b), the question becomes how to apply it in a manner 
consistent with the Charter. We agree with the Supreme Court in Suberu 
that the approach taken in the court below was ill-advised. Not only did it 
require a strained reading of “without delay”,162 but the uncertain duration 
of the “brief interlude” contemplated by the Court of Appeal would cause 
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many police officers to issue the caution prematurely, thereby prolonging 
the detention of the innocent (on the minimal standard of reasonable suspi-
cion) and make it more difficult to obtain reliable, incriminating evidence 
from the guilty.163 In other cases, police would wait too long, depriving 
suspects of their rights in precisely the circumstances when they are most 
needed to protect against inquisitorial overreaching.  
The better solution is to justify a brief override of section 10(b)  
under section 1 of the Charter. This is the approach that the Supreme 
Court has taken for roadside investigations relating to motor vehicle 
safety. In each of these cases, the courts have found that the claimant was 
detained but that the failure to comply with section 10(b) was justified 
under section 1 of the Charter.164 The Court did not take this approach in 
the customs and immigration cases. Despite the fact that failure to coop-
erate in these circumstances is an offence,165 the Court found that people 
stopped for routine questioning and searches at border crossings are not 
detained for Charter purposes.166 This approach is plainly inconsistent 
with the Therens/Grant definition of psychological detention with legal 
compulsion.167 The same result could have more sensibly been achieved, 
however, by applying section 1 of the Charter. 
Justifying non-compliance with section 10(b) for investigative deten-
tion will help ensure that questioning remains brief and preliminary and 
thus limit the tendency of courts to increasingly expand the boundaries of  
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the common law power.168 As in the contexts of vehicle stops169 and bor-
der crossings,170 police seeking to investigate further would have to issue 
the caution immediately. Further, because such questioning by definition 
exceeds the scope of the investigative detention power, police would ei-
ther have to make an arrest or make it absolutely clear that the suspect is 
free to leave.  
What precisely do we mean by “brief” and “preliminary”? Courts 
have been reluctant to impose a quantitative limit on the length of inves-
tigative detentions,171 and we do not propose one here. However, absent 
exceptional circumstances, a detention lasting longer than 20 minutes 
would seem to be excessive.172 The scope of investigative detention 
would also be exceeded by questioning that is the functional equivalent 
of an interrogation. As under the Moran approach to detention discussed 
above, an investigative detention (and the accompanying suspension of 
the right to counsel) would expire when police decide that the individual 
probably committed an offence and ask questions designed to induce 
self-incriminating answers. These are precisely the circumstances when 
suspects need the protection of the right to counsel.173 
To summarize, under Mann police may detain for investigative pur-
poses when they reasonably suspect that a person has recently committed 
(or is still committing) a criminal offence.174 Investigative detention can 
be triggered by either physical or (non-legal) psychological detention. 
Under our proposal, in the latter case detention arises from constraints on 
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liberty and is decided with reference only to the first variable of the test 
we proposed above (“the language used to initiate the encounter”). Police 
effecting such detentions need not comply with section 10(b) of the 
Charter. In contrast, police triggering a detention by means of the second 
variable (“the nature of any ensuing questioning”) exceeds the scope of 
investigative detention and must therefore comply with section 10(b) of 
the Charter. Police wishing to interrogate likely perpetrators without is-
suing the Charter caution must therefore make it clear that they are not 
being detained and are free to leave.  
Ideally, this proposal would be effected by legislation upheld by the 
courts under section 1 of the Charter.175 If the courts apply Grant in the 
way that we have proposed, police may become legitimately frustrated 
with their obligation under the current law to comply with section 10(b) 
during investigative detention and lobby Parliament for a statutory re-
sponse.  
What is at least as likely, however, is that courts will strain to avoid 
finding detention, permitting police to substantially curtail suspects’ lib-
erty without reasonable suspicion. In this scenario, Parliament may 
conclude (as it often does) that there is little to be gained from legislative 
intervention.176  
Though in principle a second-best solution, the most realistic one 
may thus be for the Supreme Court to reconsider Suberu and uphold un-
der section 1 the denial of the right to counsel during lawful common law 
investigative detentions.177 Indeed, as long as the courts are prepared to 
recognize new common law police powers, some may inevitably have to 
be justified under section 1 of the Charter. The Supreme Court has held 
that common law rules are “prescribed by law” within the meaning of 
that provision.178 It has also upheld Charter-limiting common law rules 
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(including newly recognized ones) in many other contexts.179 And unlike 
in any of these cases, justifying the limitation of section 10(b) for inves-
tigative detention would benefit both the state and the individual. Police 
would find it easier to obtain preliminary investigative information from 
persons reasonably suspected of criminal activity, and such persons (if 
not arrested) would on average spend less time in custody. Of course, 
applying section 10(b) to investigative detention would benefit factually 
guilty suspects who exercised their rights and remained silent as a conse-
quence of talking to a lawyer. But given the limited, inherently non-
coercive nature of the questioning permitted for investigative detentions, 
this loss of protection against self-incrimination is not worthy of consid-
eration under section 1 of the Charter.180  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, the Court’s judgment in Grant on the meaning of non-
legal psychological detention seems to be written exclusively for one 
audience: lower courts. A second, and equally important, audience (the 
police) is ignored, encouraging a troubling division between law in the 
courtroom and law on the streets. For those most likely to be victims of 
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unjustified police stops, this division can only worsen existing cynicism 
toward the law, the police and the criminal justice system.181 If the pur-
pose of section 9 of the Charter is to protect people from unjustified state 
interference, the constitutional safeguard must meaningfully regulate the 
countless daily interactions between police and members of the public. 
The starting point for such an endeavour must be clear guidance for the 
police. We hope that in years to come Canadian courts will interpret and 
apply Grant to provide just that. 
We also hope that Parliament and the Supreme Court, ideally work-
ing in constructive dialogue, revisit the application of section 10(b) of the 
Charter to investigative detention. It is a rare occasion indeed when the 
interests of the individual and state coincide in constitutional criminal 
procedure. This is one of them. Justifying non-compliance with section 
10(b) as a reasonable limit under section 1 of the Charter would help po-
lice obtain valuable evidence of crime, protect innocent suspects from 
lengthy and intrusive detention, and prompt courts to confine the investi-
gative detention power to its proper, limited scope. 
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